Operative part of
the Supreme Court judgement delivered by Justice P.B. Sawant and Justice
S. Mohan on 9.2.1995 in the case between the Union of India & Cricket
Association of Bengal. We, therefore, hold as
follows:
(i) The airwaves or frequencies are a public
property. Their use has to be controlled and regulated by a public
authority in the interests of the public and to prevent the invasion of
their rights. Since, the electronic media involves the use of the
airwaves, this factor creates an in-built restriction on its use as in the
case of any other public property.
(ii) The right to impart and
receive information is a species of the right to freedom of speech and
expression guaranteed by Article 19 (1)(a) of the Constitution. A citizen
has a fundamental right to use the best means of imparting and receiving
information and as such to have an access to telecasting for the purpose.
However, this right to have an access to telecasting has limitations on
account of the use of the public property, Viz., the airwaves, involved in
the exercise of the right and can be controlled and regulated by the
public authority. This limitation imposed by the nature of the public
property involved in the use of the electronic media is in addition to the
restriction imposed on the right to freedom of speech and expression under
Article 19 (2) of the Constitution.
(iii) The Central Government
shall take immediate steps to establish an independent autonomous public
authority representatives of all sections and interests in the society to
control and regulate the use of the airwaves.
(iv) Since, the
matches have been telecast pursuant to the impugned order of the High
Court, it is not necessary to decide the correctness of the said
order.
(v) The High Court will now apportion between the CAB and
the DD the revenue generated by the advertisements on T.V. during the
telecasting of both the series of the cricket matches viz. the Hero Cup,
and the International Cricket Matches played in India from October to
December, 1994, after hearing the parties on the subject.
The civil
appeals are disposed of accordingly.
In view of the disposal of the civil appeals, the writ petition
filed by the Cricket Association of Bengal also stands disposed of
accordingly.
Operative part of the Supreme
Court Judgement delivered by Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy on 9.2.1995 in the
case between the U.O.I. & Cricket Association of
Bengal.
SUMMARY ( As given in the Judgement) In
this summary too, the expression ‘broadcast media’ means the electronic
media now represented and operated by AIR and Doordarshan and not any
other services.
1. (a) Game of Cricket,
like any other sports event, provides entertainment. Providing
entertainment is implied in freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by
Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution subject to this rider that where
speech and conduct are joined in a single course of action, the free
speech values must be balanced against competing societal interests. The
petitioners (CAB and BCCI) therefore have a right to organise cricket
matches in India, whether with or without the participation of foreign
teams. But what they are now seeking is a license to telecast their
matches through an agency of their choice- a foreign agency in both the
cases – and through telecasting equipment brought in by such foreign
agency from out side the country. In the case of Hero Cup Matches,
organised by BCCI, they did not ask for this facility for the reason that
their foreign agent has arranged direct uplinking with the Russian
satellite Gorizon . In both cases, they wanted the permission to import
the telecasting equipment along with the personnel to operate it by moving
it to places all over the country wherever the matches were to be played.
They claimed this license, or permission, as it may be called, as a matter
of right said to be flowing from Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution.
They say that the authorities are bound to grant such license/permission,
without any conditions, all that they are entitled to do, it is submitted,
is to collect technical fees wherever their services are availed, like the
services of VSNL in the case of Hero Cup Matches. This pleas is in
principle no different freedom to right to establish and operate private
telecasting stations. In principle, there is no difference between a
permanent TV station and a temporary one; similarly there is no
distinction in principle between a stationery TV facility and a mobile
one; so also is there no distinction in principle between a regular TV
facility and a TV facility for a given event or series of events. If the
right claimed by the petitioners (CAB and BCCI) is held to be
constitutionally sanctioned one, then each and every citizen of this
country must also be entitled to claim similar right in respect of his
event or events, as the case may be. I am of the opinion that no such
right flows from Article 19 (1) (a).
(b) Airwaves constitute public property and
must be utilised for advancing public good. No individual has a right to
utilise them at his choice and pleasure and for purposes of his choice
including profit. The right of free speech
guaranteed by Article 19 (1) (a) does not include the right to use
airwaves, which are public property. The airwaves can be used by a citizen
for the purpose of broadcasting only when allowed to do so by a statute
and in accordance with such statute. Airwaves, being public property, it
is the duty of the State to see that airwaves are so utilised as to
advance the free speech right of the citizens which is served by ensuring
plurality and diversity of views, opinions and ideas. This is imperative
in every democracy where freedom of speech is assured. The free speech right guaranteed
to every citizen of this country does not encompass the right to use these
airwaves at his choosing. Conceding, such a
right would be detrimental to the free speech rights of the body of
citizens in as much as only the privileged few powerful economic,
commercial and political interests- would come to dominate the media. By
manipulating the news, views and information, by indulging in
misinformation and disinformation, to suit their commercial or other
interests, they would be harming – and not serving – the principle of
plurality and diversity of views, news, ideas and
opinions.
This has been the experience of
Italy, where a limited right, i.e. at the local level but not at the
national level was recognised. It is also not possible to imply or infer a
right from the guarantee of free speech which only a few can
enjoy.
(c) Broadcasting media is inherently different from Press or
other means of communication/information. The analogy of Press is
misleading and inappropriate. This is also the view expressed by several
Constitutional Codes including that of the United States of
America.
(d) I must clarify what I say, it is
that the right claimed by the petitioners (CAB and BCCI) - which in effect
is no different in principle from a right to establish and operate a
private TV station - does not flow from Article 19 (1) (a); that such a
right is not implicit in it. The question whether such right should be
given to the citizens of this country is a matter of policy for the
Parliament. Having regard to the revolution in information technology and
the developments all around, Parliament may, or may not, decide to confer
such right. If it wishes to confer such a right, it can only be by way of
an Act made by Parliament. The Act made should be consistent with the
right of free speech of the citizens and must have to contain strict
programme and other controls, as has been provided, for example in the
Broadcasting Act, 1991 in the United Kingdom. This is the implicit command
of Article 19 (1) (a) and is essential to preserve and promote plurality
and diversity of views, news, opinions and idea.
(e) There is an inseparable
inter-connection between freedom of speech and the stability of the
society, i. e. stability of a nation-State. They contribute to each other.
Ours is a nascent republic. We are yet to achieve the goal of a stable
society. This country cannot also affort to read into Article 19 (1) (a)
an unrestricted right to licensing (right of broadcasting) as claimed by
the petitioners therein.
(f) In the case before us, both
the petitioners have sold their right to telecast the matches to a foreign
agency. They have parted with the right. The right to telecast the
matches, including the right to import, install and operate the requisite
equipment, is thus really sought by the foreign agencies and not by the
petitioners. Hence, the question of violation of their right under Article
19 (1) (a) resulting from refusal of license/ permission to such foreign
agencies does not arise.
2. The Government monopoly of broadcasting
media in this country is the result of historical and other factors. This
is true of every other country, to start with. That India was not a free
country till 1947 and its citizens did not have constitutionally
guaranteed fundamental freedom till 1950 coupled with the fact that our
Constitution is just about forty five years into operation explains the
Government monopoly. As pointed out in the body of the judgement,
broadcasting media was a monopoly of the Government, to start with in
every country except the United States where a conscious decision was
taken at the very beginning not to have State monopoly over the medium.
Until recently, the broadcasting media has been in the hands of
public/statutory corporations in most of the West European countries.
Private broadcasting is comparatively a recent phenomenon. The experience
in Italy of allowing private broadcasting at local level (while
prohibiting it at national level) has left much to be desired. It has
given rise to powerful media empires which development is certainly not
conducive to free speech right of the
citizens.
3. (a) It has
been held by this Court – and rightly – that broadcasting media is
affected by the free speech right of the citizens guaranteed by Article 19
(1) (a). This is also the view expressed by all the Constitutional Courts
whose opinions have been referred to in the body of the judgement. Once
this is so, monopoly of this medium (broadcasting media), whether by
Government or by an individual, body or organisation is unacceptable.
Clause (2) of Article 19 does not permit a monopoly in the matter of
freedom of speech and expression as is permitted by Clause (6) of Article
19 vis-à-vis the right guaranteed by Aarticle 19 (1) (a).
(b) The
right of free speech and expression includes the right to receive and
impart information. For ensuring the free speech right of the citizens of
this country, it is necessary that the citizens have the benefit of
plurality of views and a range of opinions on all public issues. A
successful democracy posits an “aware” citizenry. Diversity of opinions,
views, ideas and ideologies is essential to enable the citizens to arrive
at informed judgement on all issues touching them. This cannot be provided
by a medium controlled by a monopoly – whether the monopoly is of the
State or any other individual, group or organisation. As a matter of fact,
private broadcasting stations may perhaps be more prejudicial to free
speech right of the citizens than the government controlled media, as
explained in the body of the judgement. The broadcasting media should be
under the control of the public as distinct from Government. This is the
command implicit in Article 19 (1) (a). It should be operated by a public
statutory corporation or corporations, as the case may be, whose
constitution and composition must be such as to ensure its/ their
impartiality in political, economic and social matters and on all other
public issues. It/they must be required by law to present news, views and
opinions in a balanced way ensuring pluralism and diversity of opinions
and views. It/they must provide equal access to all the citizens and
groups to avail of the medium.
4. The Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 is
totally inadequate to govern an important medium like the radio and
television, i.e., broadcasting media. The Act was intended for an
altogether different purpose when it was enacted. This is the result of
the law in this country not keeping pace with the technological advances
in the field of information and communications. While all the leading
democratic countries have enacted laws specifically governing the
broadcasting media, the law in this country has stood still, rooted in the
Telegraph Act of 1885. Except Section 4 (1) and the definition of
telegraph, no other provision of the Act is shown to have any relevance to
broadcasting media. It is, therefore, imperative that the Parliament makes
a law placing the broadcasting media in the hands of a public/statutory
corporate or the corporations, as the case may be. This is
necessary to safeguard the interests of public and the interests of law as
also to avoid uncertainty, confusion and consequent
litigation
5. The CAB did not ever apply for a license under
the first proviso to Section 4 of the Telegraph Act nor did its
agents-ever make such an application. The permissions, clearances or
exemption obtained by it from the several departments ( mentioned in
judgement) are no substitute for a licence under Section 4(1) proviso. In
the absence of such a license, the CAB had no right in law to have its
matches telecast by an agency of its choice. The legality or validity of
the orders passed by Shri N. Vithal, Secretary to the Government of India,
Telecommunications Department, need not be gone into since it has become
academic. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the charge of
malafides or of arbitrary and authoritarian conduct attributed to
Doordarshan and Ministry of Information and Broadcasting is not
acceptable. No opinion need be expressed on the allegations made in the
Interlocutory Application filed by BCCI in these matters. Its intervention
was confined to legal questions only.
6. Now the question arises,
what is the position till the Central Government or the Parliament take
steps as contemplated in para (4) of the summary, i.e., if any sporting
event or other event is to be telecast from the Indian soil? The obvious
answer flowing from the judgement ( and Paras (1) and (4) of this summary
) is that the organiser of such event has to approach the nodal Ministry
as specified in the decision of the Meeting of the Committee of
Secretaries held on November 12, 1993. I have no reason to doubt that such
a request would be considered by the nodal Ministry and the AIR and
Doordarshan on its merits, keeping in view the public interest. In case of
any difference of opinion or dispute regarding the monetary terms on which
such telecast is to be made, matter can always be referred to an
Arbitrator or a panel of Arbitrators. In case, the nodal Ministry or the
AIR or Doordarshan find such broadcast/telecast not feasible, then they
may consider the grant of permission to the organisers to engage an agency
of their own for the purpose. Of course, it would be equally open to the
nodal Ministry (Government of India) to permit such foreign agency in
addition to AIR/Doordarshan, if they are of the opinion that such a course
is called for in the circumstances.
For the above reasons, the
appeals, writ petition and applications are disposed of in the above
terms. No costs.
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This judgment was one of the most progressive judgment delivered by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in its History. It is observed that this
judgment was one of the reason that hastened the creation of
Prasarbharathi. But the unfortunate fact about this
judgment is that no organisation or individual have not yet
used this judgment properly in the interest of public to ensure that
Air waves which belongs to public should be used to advance the public
good and not for the greed and the selfish motives of of
the Private Broadcasters.
Air Waves Belongs to Public
Property is the generally accepted concept, internationally and similar
judgments were declared
by the apex court of Srilanka also.
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